Title: Breaking the bombers
Author: Mark Shaw
ISBN: 9781776191512
Publisher: Jonathan Ball Publishers SA
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As an author, he finds a compelling balance between facts, detail and evidence, and a “story” that is made colourful by the dramatic events, interesting human personalities and interactive themes that he weaves into the plot. His sense of history and his understanding of the complexity of the context are excellent, and thus the plot is well articulated against the background of what was happening before and during the very significant 1990s.
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Introduction
When I agreed to review Mark Shaw’s book Breaking the bombers, my intention was to read it from the perspective of the “regular” reader, but once I got past the preface, it was evident that the book was loaded with content that is not unlike the evidence a sociologist would accumulate when conducting a study. Shaw conducted more than 60 interviews and reviewed the extensive volume of literature and documents available on Pagad and the state agencies of the time. Accordingly, I have elected to do this review by applying a sociological approach. The morphogenetic approach of British sociologist Margaret Archer is used to illuminate the complex interplay between the contextual dynamics (social structure and idea systems) and the human agency that the Pagad story is able to evidence.
First, some brief notes about the author and a general introduction of the book.
The author, Mark Shaw, is currently the director of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Previously, he was the National Research Foundation Professor of Justice and Security at the University of Cape Town, Department of Criminology. He worked for ten years at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including as inter-regional advisor, as chief of the Criminal Justice Reform Unit, and with the Global Programme against Transnational Organised Crime. He also worked in the South African government and civil society on issues of public safety and urban violence in the post-apartheid transition. He holds a PhD from the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and has published widely on organised crime, security and justice reform issues. He is eminently well equipped to write with authority on this fascinating, multi-themed and complex topic. As an author, he finds a compelling balance between facts, detail and evidence, and a “story” that is made colourful by the dramatic events, interesting human personalities and interactive themes that he weaves into the plot. His sense of history and his understanding of the complexity of the context are excellent, and thus the plot is well articulated against the background of what was happening before and during the very significant 1990s. Thus the book provides an opportunity to extract relevant and useful insights, apply a particular analytical approach and ask some questions about lessons and insights that could inform contemporary strategies that are designed to bring about change.
Breaking the bombers tells the story of how Pagad, originally an anti-gang and anti-drugs movement, turned into an urban terror movement in the late 1990s in Cape Town. It was eventually brought under control by the often not-so-concerted actions of different state entities. Thus, besides providing insights into Pagad that have not been covered in the media and literature up to now, the book places a critical spotlight on the actions of the different state agencies that are responsible for safety and security, that is, the South African police, the intelligence services of the state, and the justice system. Pagad and the state agencies are depicted as dynamic and changing institutional systems. The sociologically interesting aspects of the book have to do with the intriguing interplay between the state, Pagad, gangs, communities and the evolving and changing sociopolitical context. The book contains detail that enables this kind of sociological analysis. Indeed, lecturers in sociology could prescribe or recommend the reading of this book to their students to explore the dialectical interplay between context (structure and ideology) and agency.
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Shaw conducted more than 60 interviews and reviewed the extensive volume of literature and documents available on Pagad and the state agencies of the time.
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- Sociological analysis
It is common for sociologists who analyse social systems and institutions to make a distinction between structure and agency. Structure refers to the recurrent patterned arrangements that influence, limit, constrain or enable the choices and opportunities available to individuals and groups. It manifests as patterns of the distribution of power, wealth and opportunity among a population, which represent the outcomes of past interactions. Agency refers to the people, individuals (particularly leaders) and groups within these systemic units and their differential capacity to act independently and make choices about what they believe and think and how they act.
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The sociologically interesting aspects of the book have to do with the intriguing interplay between the state, Pagad, gangs, communities and the evolving and changing sociopolitical context.
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The late British sociologist Margaret Archer (1943-2023) was one of the best exponents of this type of work. Her Morphogenetic approach (1995*) adds a third dimension, and that is culture, which is the shared ideas, ideologies, mindsets, beliefs, values and norms that influence, constrain and enable human action and social structures in a particular societal system. Archer then analyses the interplay between structure or culture and agency to explain how structure, culture and agency morph over time. Thus all three of the analytical dimensions – structure, culture and agency – are deemed to have relatively autonomous causal impact and explanatory significance. (I prefer the word ideational systems to avoid a misunderstanding about “culture”.)
Using these concepts (structure, ideational systems and agency) allows a morphogenetic analysis which provides insight into the nature and change of Pagad and those who were trying to “break” it. In each instance, there are structural, ideational and agency variables that can be identified, studied and understood, and in each instance the changes (morphing) that took place are better understood by reflecting on the complex, mutually influencing relationships between structure, ideational systems and agency.
Simply put, structural and ideational contexts influence how people act, but people also have the ability to influence, create, recreate, resist and transform structural and ideational contexts. That is what is meant by agency.
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To the credit of Mark Shaw, he provides sufficient insight into the actors and their actions to allow for appreciation of the complex socio-psychological reality of the mutuality of context and agency.
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- The conditioning effect of structural and ideational contexts
Both the members of Pagad and the members of the police and other security agencies inherited, came into, lived in and worked in a structural and ideational context. This means they were influenced, conditioned, constrained or enabled by their position or status in the social structure and the prevailing idea systems. They were all born into families and communities that were socioeconomically and sociopolitically placed, located or positioned. This contextual positioning of people has consequences for what is or is not possible in their lives, how they see the world and relate to others, and how they do their jobs and solve the problems that confront them. Some people become members of gangs, commit crimes or become corrupt because these are life options available to them and are, for some reason, more attractive or less easy to avoid than others. Being born as a “coloured” person in District Six in the 1960s and being born and growing up as an Afrikaner person in a white, middle-class suburb at the same time made for two potentially very different paths of life.
However, before one strides into the trap of social determinism, which implies that people have no options and choices but to play out the roles and positions that they are cast into, one has to acknowledge the relative autonomous capacity of agency. As suggested above, structure and ideational systems can influence and shape the choices and actions of individuals by providing them with frameworks for understanding and interpreting the world, but human beings – as individuals and in groups – and leaders also have the capacity to act autonomously and make their own choices. This can lead to the creation, transformation or even resistance of societal structures and ideational systems.
Members of Pagad and the members of the police and other security agencies were all unique human beings with minds of their own. This means that structural and ideational conditions influenced them (created enabling or constraining conditions), but did not determine how they would think and act. Therefore, we can explore, study, research and explain actions of violence, terror and corruption and the failure of state agencies to act adequately, by making causal linkages with the structural and ideational context. However, we should not elevate causal relations to justifications or excuses, or suggest that these individuals, leaders and groups had no other option but to act in the way that they did. The effect of accepting that people’s actions are not of their own choice, but the involuntary result of context and conditions, is profoundly disabling and misleading. It means that no one needs to take responsibility for their bad, cruel and corrupt actions. On the other hand, no act can be described as good and moral if it is done unwillingly or under compulsion. Only voluntary deeds can be described as noble and moral.
So, a key insight is that we must find the balance between context and agency, and we cannot make a simple analytical choice for the one or the other. Indeed, one of the fascinating features of the book is to see how individual agency made a difference at vital and critical times. Ali Parker, an early leader of Pagad, was motivated to get rid of gangs and drugs but was not willing to resort to violence and killings, and under his leadership Pagad was potentially a valuable asset to the community. Similarly, there are people like Ayob Mungalee, who was said to be deeply concerned about the impact of drugs and gangs but was also against the killings that became associated with Pagad. On the other hand, Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim, who was a powerful and central figure in the leadership, was reputed to promote the radical Islamic views of Qibla. Much of the terror and violence that are attributed to Pagad occurred under his watch. Ebrahim Jeneker survived an attack by gangsters as a teenager, and this reputedly motivated him to commit multiple murders of gangsters, gang leaders and drug merchants. He also sometimes spared the life of a target based on his own reasons. Similarly, among the police and intelligence, individuals like Leonard Knipe, David Africa, Riaan Booysen, Mzwandile Petros, Arthur Fraser, Barry Gilder and Bulelani Ngcuka were all very different and unique. Each of them was conditioned by the same or similar societal contextual influences, and yet they were not equally committed and each acted in their own unique way. To the credit of Mark Shaw, he provides sufficient insight into the actors and their actions to allow for appreciation of the complex socio-psychological reality of the mutuality of context and agency.
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Shaw provides intriguing detail around the changing leadership and how the modus operandi morphed from violence and intimidation to killing and terror, from shootings to petrol bombs and pipe bombs that killed innocent bystanders and members of the public.
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- The morphing of context and agency
The next key insight and subtle but powerful theme that emerges from the book is the morphogenetic transformations that are illuminated when we use the tools of morphogenetic analysis. The word morphogenetic can be split into morph (which refers to a change from one condition or state to another) and genetic or genesis (which, in this usage, refers to the origin of change as emerging from within the system), that is, the above-stated dynamic interplay between structure, ideational systems and agency over time.
Shaw fittingly uses the word morph on several occasions to show how Pagad and the state agencies altered, changed and transformed over time due to the actions of individuals and in response to particular contextual dynamics. For current purposes, the focus here will be on Pagad and on the state police and intelligence agencies that were tasked to attend to the situation regarding Pagad. While a big part of the book is about Pagad and its morphing over time in response to changing conditions and internal dynamics, the author’s aim is clearly to reflect on how the government agencies responded to a serious security threat during the time of transition from apartheid to democracy. It thereby provides insights that may be of relevance for current conditions.
Let us first look at Pagad from a morphogenetic point of view.
The morphing of Pagad from civic response to urban terror movement
Shaw does an excellent job of introducing the reader to Pagad. The extent to which readers will learn what they did not know about this intriguing social phenomenon could be an indication of how inadequately the general public was informed through the media and other sources about Pagad.
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) originally formed in December 1995 in Cape Town, South Africa. The group was initially formed to act as a community-based anti-crime organisation, with the purpose of reducing gang-related behaviour and drug dealing in their neighbourhoods. In the forming stages, the group had a majority of Muslim members, but was not exclusively Muslim. Drug dealing in the neighbourhoods was an ongoing problem for residents, but they found it particularly difficult to act because the drug dealers were supported both by criminal gangs and by some corrupt police officers.
The prelude to the Pagad story is the systemic and socially disruptive effect of the forced removals from District Six. Many of the people who lived in the areas in which Pagad was born, and many of the people who supported it, originated from District Six in Cape Town, from where they had been forcibly removed during the apartheid years. District Six was an area where diverse racial groups had lived together since 1838. It was declared a “whites-only” area under the Group Areas Act in 1966. The area was portrayed by the state at the time as crime-ridden and dangerous, with immoral activities like gambling, drinking and prostitution. Ultimately, the government wanted to separate the races. The first demolitions began in 1968, and over a period of 15 years, non-white members of the District Six community were forcibly removed, mainly to the Belhar township, Rylands Estate and Hanover Park on the Cape Flats. About 30 000 people living in the specific group area were affected.
Morphogenetically, the structural die was cast. By way of the racial policies of apartheid, many people who lived in District Six and everyone who was moved to the Cape Flats were defined and declared as “non-white”, and this relegated them to a lesser status in the sociopolitical system. More specifically, in terms of social structuration, the forced move to the Cape Flats was a ruthless act of social segregation and marginalisation, with massive disempowering consequences. Contrary to government depictions, before the removals, District Six was a vibrant and diverse community with a thriving economy. The area was home to 8 500 workers, of whom 90% were employed in and immediately around the central business district. The forced removals led to the destruction of homes and businesses. The only buildings left standing were places of worship. This had a negative impact on the local economy, as businesses were forced to close and residents were forced to relocate to other areas. The removals also led to the loss of jobs and income for many residents. The residents of District Six lost their work, businesses, homes, community and way of life.
How did these disrupted and unsettled communities and their leaders respond? Most of them had little option but to go along with what was forced onto them. These conditions, however, also activated some of the community leadership, who felt obliged to respond. Thus, not only was the structural context evidently disempowering, but it also provided ideal conditions for adversarial ideas and anti-state ideologies to emerge, grow and guide the thinking and eventual actions of local leaders and followers. Much of the initial ideational meaning-giving was evidently derived from a conservative, concerned community worldview informed by traditional Muslim religious views. The original actors and agents of Pagad were leaders like Ali Parker, who, based on the evidence generated by Shaw, were truly concerned about their community. They targeted the gangsters, but did not promote killings and certainly did not promote public violence.
However, the presumed, initially conservative self- and community-preserving reading or interpretation of Islam became more complex as Pagad leaders acquired more vested interest in taking more radical action. A more radical form of Islam (associated with Qibla) emerged. There is reference in the book to suggestions that Pagad was a front for Qibla and that the Qibla faction strategically guided Pagad through its morphing process. Like Shaw, I am inclined to think that it was a more complex multi-causal process of emergence that happened over time. Thus, the structural context conditioned the way in which people perceived the situation; various answers to questions were found in various readings and understandings of the Quran, and these changed over time as people acted differently in a changing context.
We can expect that the subordinated groups in society will respond, but one can never predict and assume the specific trajectories and contours of the future. In this case, the original Pagad was an understandable community response to a challenging situation. But one could not predict how it would unfold in the future. A crucial factor was the failure of the state to respond appropriately. This created conditions for the morphing of Pagad into something much more radical and destructive. By failing to take it seriously and to respond appropriately or even complement its efforts, the state agencies enabled Pagad to grow, expand, become more elaborate, acquire more power and become increasingly ambitious and greedy. Thus, the motives and motivations of leaders seemingly changed over time. The role of money must be considered. One could argue that money was, in many instances, an underlying motive from the outset, but this also morphed into unrestrained greed. When Pagad killed a gangster or drug merchant, they also took money, jewels and other valuables from the scene. Money was likely to be a motivation from the outset in a socioeconomically challenged community, but the nature and extent of the greed turned some of Pagad into a gang of thieves. Again, the failure of the state police and security agencies to act appropriately provided for and complemented the criminal turn in Pagad.
Shaw provides intriguing detail around the changing leadership and how the modus operandi morphed from violence and intimidation to killing and terror, from shootings to petrol bombs and pipe bombs that killed innocent bystanders and members of the public. He describes an escalation that was given the space to evolve and become more elaborate. Thus, one can blame the failure of the apartheid state for the original conditions that led to the formation of Pagad, and the failure of the police and other state agencies to respond to it, as major reasons why Pagad morphed into a radical terror movement. However, this explanation must be seen together with the morphing of Pagad leadership into power-hungry, self-centred and greedy opportunists who increasingly exploited a bad situation to serve their own interests.
The lesson is that we must understand societal phenomena in time. Pagad was not a static entity, but morphed over time. There is an early Pagad which was an understandable response to a community threat, but there is a radical Pagad and even a contemporary Pagad. When we speak about Pagad, we must make clear which one we are talking about. It is analytically inadequate not to consider that social and human entities change over time, and the same applies to the agencies of the state.
The morphogenesis of the state agencies
Next, the focus will be on the topic of the state and its capacity to deal with a serious threat like escalating gangsterism and vigilantism that gets out of hand.
The bigger context that impacted on the lives of all South Africans for a long time was defined by the policies, practices and ideas of, first, colonialism and then apartheid. While the impact on black, coloured and Asian people was devastating in a direct and undeniable way, it is ironic that in some way or another and at some time or another, white South Africans were likely also to become the victims of this ill-fated systemic situation. The context in which the (mostly) men who served in the police and intelligence agencies during the apartheid era, was dominated by the politics of the Nationalist Party, with its racial policies and hierarchical view of the world. The consequences of apartheid for white men in South Africa were complex and varied. On the one hand, they enjoyed significant privileges and advantages over other racial groups, including better access to education, healthcare and job opportunities. However, the system of apartheid also created a deeply unjust, segregated and divided society. The apartheid regime enforced laws that separated black and white South Africans in various aspects of life, including living situations, movement, work and education, which led to a lack of mutual understanding and empathy between different racial groups. Additionally, the system of apartheid created a culture of fear and mistrust, which had long-lasting effects on all of South African society, including white men.
Police and security agencies were tasked with enforcing laws of racial segregation, securing the minority government, and protecting the white population from the majority non-white population. The role of intelligence agencies was to protect white minority interests and enforce the policies of racial segregation. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) were responsible for gathering and assessing intelligence about anti-apartheid and liberation movements; conducting internal surveillance; and identifying targets for raids, both within South Africa and in neighbouring countries. These agencies were involved in activities such as identifying dissidents, assassinating real and suspected enemies of the state, and supporting and training guerrilla movements in other African countries. The intelligence community operated extensively and effectively, maintaining a secretive and aggressive security service that played a significant role in upholding the apartheid regime. The consequences of these actions included a deep-seated sense of mistrust and fear among the population, as well as a negative impact on the relationship between the intelligence agencies and communities. The police played a military-like role, enforcing unpopular laws, which created a profound crisis of legitimacy for the police. Street-level policing was often conducted in a heavy-handed style, with bias against black citizens and little respect for rights or due process. Criminal investigations were often reliant on confessions under duress, and harsh security legislation provided for or tolerated various forms of coercion and torture. The policing techniques were outmoded, partly because of the campaign for international isolation by the apartheid government. It was not easy to be different or to have divergent political views. Yet, not even the white or Afrikaner communities were homogeneous. There is not much room for deviation from the mainstream in an authoritarian society. The message is that those in power can impose their will, but one should expect that there will always be a response. Even if not immediately, there will be a response from those who are subjected to the excessive use of power. Eventually. And this happened or started to happen in 1994. The transition of 1994 arguably started due to the realisation of a stalemate; leaders taking action on both sides created a new ideational context, and new leaders emerged to prominence. How this happened is the topic of many books and articles. The focus here is on the complexity of the period of transition from the early 1990s to around 2000.
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So, a significant point: in the absence of a capable police and security system, communities were likely to resort to vigilantism and self-help action when confronted with a serious threat.
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The dilemma of the transition was two contrasting regimes that inevitably coexisted for a certain period. The old police and security people, and the new ones coming in. Old ways of doing things, versus new ways of doing things, and a lack of coherence between and among all these actors and agencies. The result was that the police and intelligence agencies were part of the problem during the 1994 to late 1990s period. For a long time, they did not see the problem because drugs and gangsterism were not high on the agenda up to then, and not only did they lack experience, but they were also not inclined to work together.
So, a significant point: in the absence of a capable police and security system, communities were likely to resort to vigilantism and self-help action when confronted with a serious threat. The impression is that the early leaders of Pagad did not have much confidence in the SAPS and other agencies. Pagad’s initial modus operandi must be understood in the context of the vacuum created by the disinterested state agencies. In addition, the morphing of Pagad into a criminal terror movement must also be understood against the background of ineffective and incoherent state action. Thus, the divide between the police and other agencies in security and intelligence contributed to “sloppy” and unprofessional work. Again, one can explain and understand what was happening in these agencies in the early 1990s, but it does not justify the poor, fumbling and incoherent response as Pagad was becoming more assertive and threatening to public safety.
Thus, an important lesson and confirmation for contemporary South Africa has to do with the consequences of inadequate state response. How is that situation similar to the current situation, where communities have to cope with the failure of state agencies to control and reduce crime and to render effective services? What can we assume and expect can happen under these conditions? Vigilantism, communities doing their own thing – and, at some point or another, there will be a change of leadership! Forced or not, at some point there will be a change of leaders that will demonstrate the power and potential of agency.
This brings us to a key moment in this intriguing storyline, when new leadership stepped into the situation. In his inaugural speech as president, Thabo Mbeki announced the creation of the Scorpions. It consisted of a prosecutor, police and intelligence mix. That was the first part of the recipe; the right ingredients were on the table. The challenge then was whether these ingredients were going to mix appropriately. Stated differently, the question was whether they would collaborate or keep on competing and undermining one another. The evidence is that it required leadership (agency) to be effective.
It was Christmas Day 1999 when, after hearing about the Green Point bomb, Mbeki phoned Steve Tshwete, the new minister of safety and security. Bulelani Ngcuka, director of the National Prosecuting Authority and head of the Scorpions, told Mark Shaw that the president said something along the lines of: “This is enough. Stop it now!” Tshwete called Ngcuka at 7:00 am on Christmas morning, and he then called Percy Sonn (the founder of the Investigative Directorate for Organised Crime in the Western Cape), Mzwandile Petros, Anwar Dramat and David Africa of the undercover operations unit of the SAPS, and others to meet with him in his office. On that day, with Ngcuka taking the lead, the key agencies agreed on a strategy and made a commitment to collaborate instead of working against one another. The idea of targeting Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim as the key player at the head of Pagad’s campaign of violence was hugely significant and changed the course of history. Through collective and collaborative effort, the state agencies at last started “getting their act together” and succeeded in “breaking the bombers”.
There is no need to elaborate here on the strategy and tactics or on how they were implemented; the key, final insight is about collective and collaborative agency. The second key lesson: this is a message that is as relevant today as it was in 2000. If you want to respond to the complex challenges of a complex society, it is vital that the leadership and the agencies they have control over act in a concerted and collaborative manner.
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The intelligence community operated extensively and effectively, maintaining a secretive and aggressive security service that played a significant role in upholding the apartheid regime. The consequences of these actions included a deep-seated sense of mistrust and fear among the population, as well as a negative impact on the relationship between the intelligence agencies and communities.
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- Collaboration as a solution to the failure of agency
The problem of institutions and systems that are not functioning optimally is a major issue in contemporary South Africa. There are many variables and factors that can explain the problem, but the lack of cooperation and collaboration is often the X factor. Shaw provides excellent evidence to show that wherever and whenever different societal agents and agencies started moving towards cooperation and collaboration, they started becoming effective. When the agencies of the state started talking to one another and when leadership compelled the institutional actors to collaborate, the situation changed positively.
That is a major theme in contemporary South Africa: too many divisions, fractures, fissions and schisms on too many levels and in too many spheres, and too little focus on the common good. Too little integrated and collaborative action. For instance, the reality in many local governments in South Africa is that there is much lip service being paid to democratic, consultative and collaborative problem-solving, but inclusive and non-partisan decision-making is the exception rather than the norm in South African municipal systems.
There is much to learn about what not to do, in what happened in the period described in this book, but the main lessons are about what happens if the state is weak, internally disorganised and incoherent, non-cooperative and non-integrated. The message is that there is a need for more collaborative relationships between societal groups, agents and agencies. By implication, the call is for more open communication, listening and willingness to explore different perspectives.
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Shaw provides excellent evidence to show that wherever and whenever different societal agents and agencies started moving towards cooperation and collaboration, they started becoming effective. When the agencies of the state started talking to one another and when leadership compelled the institutional actors to collaborate, the situation changed positively.
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- The take-aways
The complex interplay between structural and ideational contexts and agency makes it impossible to know the future. However, the more we know about contexts and the people who populate those contexts, the better we will be able to explain the actions of people and groups, and the more astute we can be in strategising for dealing with societal challenges.
While people are undoubtedly impacted and influenced by the context that they are born into and exist in, human beings are certainly capable of autonomous agency. Structural and ideational contexts influence but do not determine human action. Even in the most severe conditions, we find that individuals are capable of thinking and acting differently from what the context is assumed to predict. Consequently, the histories and backgrounds of individuals and groups can be used to explain human actions, but cannot be used to justify excesses like oppression, racism, violence and corruption. That individuals, groups and leaders must take responsibility for their agency is not only a good moral lesson, but a sociological and philosophical truism.
Another truism is that the powerful can impose their will on others, but oppression, excessive inequality, marginalisation and denial of people’s legitimate needs and interests cannot be perpetuated indefinitely. At some point, people and leaders will respond. That is why apartheid could not last forever and why a government that fails to attend to people’s legitimate needs and interests is likely to elicit and produce reactions that will eventually lead to its demise.
The way that people and leaders respond to an unjust situation is not inevitably moral, good or strategically sound. Human individuality, egoism, weakness, ignorance, arrogance and self-interest make the outcomes of actions not only unpredictable, but also morally variable. There is no reason to assume that the oppressed or any other social grouping has a privileged view of reality and the truth. Moreover, what may be good and moral at one time may change over time and become immoral and indefensible. The nature of agency can change over time just like the context can change over time. In a complex societal system, the future is never predictable. The notion of the mutuality of context and agency makes for the ongoing morphogenesis of both context and agency. The Pagad of 1995 was very different from the Pagad of 1999, and we can say the same about the ANC and any other societal entity. We have to analyse them in relation to time and context.
Are the comparisons between contemporary times and 1994 to 2000 justified? Of course, the situation is very different, but it is also still very much the same in the sense that major systemic constraints and challenges still persist. Structural inequality, exclusions, marginalisation, excessive ideational contestation, and adversarial ideas and ideologies remain defining features of South African society. The paucity of overarching and inclusive ideas and solutions in South Africa makes for a fragile and vulnerable society.
Sadly, the agencies of the state, both at the time of the transition described in this book and now, were and are associated with failure and ineffectiveness. Ironically, the brief moments of success like that which resulted in “breaking the bombers” are a rare occurrence in contemporary South Africa. Indeed, even though the bombing ended in 2000, only one of the bombers was ever convicted and, more disturbingly, gangs still flourish on the Cape Flats in 2024.
Finally, an ineffective state and ineffective societal institutions and agencies create opportunities for communities and leaders to respond in adversarial ways. While there may be situations in which adversarial or confrontational agency by communities and leaders may seem inevitable, it is more likely that, in the case of complex societal problems and challenges, solutions will be found by focusing on the common good, and it is better for people to cooperate and collaborate. Mark Shaw shows in this book that if otherwise competing agencies can agree on the nature of the challenges and problems they face, consolidate their ideas and strategies and act in a planned, targeted and collaborative mode, the chances of success increase significantly!
*Archer, MS (1995). Realist social theory: The morphogenetic approach. Cambridge University Press.
See also
Polisiëringsbestuurstrategieë in intelligensiegedrewe ingrypings: vragmotorkapings as gevallestudie
Tronke bedreig ons dogters: ’n resensie van Anthony Molyneaux se Last blue ride
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